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INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades, the United States government has
expanded self-governance opportunities for Native American tribes,
reflecting the recognition that self-governance is a fundamental
sovereign function. This development in federal policy has been
implemented in several different ways, but the two primary
approaches can be found in the Tribal Self-Governance Act (TSGA)
and the “Treatment as State” (TAS) amendments of several
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environmental statutes. This Article examines the potential
application of these two approaches toward transfer of authority to
tribes under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), which
explicitly contemplates the transfer of management authority to
states, but not to tribes. This Article ultimately concludes that an
integrated approach, combining elements of both strategies, would
be the most effective solution.
In the Marine Mammal Commission’s (MMC) 2008 report, the
following recommendation was made: “[t]o prevent depletion of
subsistence species, ANOs [Alaska Native Organizations], the
IPCoMM [Indigenous People’s Council for Marine Mammals], and
federal agency partners should continue to advocate for amendments
to the MMPA that would authorize co-management partners to
adopt enforceable harvest limits in appropriate circumstances.”1
Similarly, the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) has proposed
changes to the MMPA in order to strengthen the Alaska Native comanagement role.2 In a 2008 list of priorities, the Alaska Federation
of Natives included a desire to see greater authority for tribes “to
regulate the subsistence take of marine mammals.”3 Essentially,
MMC, AFN, and others suggest that Tribes be given at least a
portion of the authority that the MMPA contemplates giving to
states—delegated management authority over marine mammals—
particularly in relation to harvest and conservation regimes.4 The
1

Marine Mammal Commission, Review of Co-Management Efforts in Alaska,
MMC 15 (2008), http://www.mmc.gov/wp-content/uploads/mmc_comgmt.pdf.
2
Alaska Federation of Natives, 2012 Annual Convention Food Security and
Management of Subsistence Resources Action Plan, NATIVE FEDERATION 2
(Nov. 11, 2012), http://www.nativefederation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/Food-Security-Action-Plan-as-amended-112012.pdf.
3
Alaska Federation of Natives, 2008 Federal Priorities: Protection of
Subsistence Hunting, Fishing and Gathering in Alaska, NATIVE FEDERATION 5–
6 (2008), www.nativefederation.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/2008-afnfederal-priorities.pdf. To that end, AFN has worked with IPCoMM, Marine
Mammal Commission, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to develop a package of MMPA amendments.
See also Alaska Federation of Natives, Alaska Native Priorities for 2012-2013
Presidential and Congressional Transition, NATIVE FEDERATION 7–8 (Dec.
2012), http://www.nativefederation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/AFN_TransitionWhitePaper_121912.pdf.
4
Additionally, “NOAA Fisheries, FWS, the Marine Mammal Commission, and
Alaska Native Groups have recommended that the provisions for development
and implementation of co-management regimes be expanded in the MMPA to
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next step in the evolution of tribal self-governance may be the
application of these principles to the MMPA. Because the State of
Alaska cannot take over management control under the MMPA,5
and Alaska Natives have such a close and statutorily protected
connection to marine mammals, Alaska provides an excellent case
study to test this theory.
Section 109 of the MMPA gives states the opportunity to apply
to the federal government for management jurisdiction under the
statute.6 If the federal government approves the transfer of authority,
then the state becomes the primary management authority for
marine mammals within that state’s boundaries. This increases the
level of access and input each state’s citizens have in the marine
mammal management process and may make it more likely that
management takes into account local cultural norms, needs, and
concerns. However, in Alaska, where marine mammals are
particularly vital to Alaska Natives on the coast for economic,
cultural, and subsistence purposes, management authority cannot
devolve to the state. And while co-management opportunities for
Alaska Natives exist, these opportunities are still more limited than
those a state would receive, even though recognized Tribes are
considered quasi-sovereigns, as states are.7
The MMPA, furthermore, is intended by design to have
management authority devolve to a more local level of government
(states) where possible, though that is not happening (and in the case
of Alaska cannot happen). Several articles argue that Native
Americans have inherent legal authority to manage or co-manage
wildlife and other public resources based on reserved treaty rights

make them binding on subsistence hunters” since currently compliance with
harvest limits set by cooperative agreements is voluntary. Donna Christie, Living
Marine Resources Management: A Proposal for Integration of United States
Management Regimes, 34 ENVTL. L. 107, 163 (2004).
5
This point will be fully explored in Part II of this Article.
6
16 U.S.C.A § 1379 (West 2016).
7
“[T]ribal governments are sovereign and have inherent powers of selfgovernment. For this reason, there is a unique government-to-government
relationship between federally-recognized tribes and the federal government.”
Martin Nie, The Use of Co-Management and Protected Land-Use Designations
to Protect Tribal Cultural Resources and Reserved Treaty Rights on Federal
Lands, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 585, 594 (2008).
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in those resources.8 However, Alaska Natives, for the most part, did
not sign treaties with the federal government.9 The central statute
defining Alaska Native land rights, the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, extinguished all indigenous hunting and fishing
rights,10 so theories based on reserved treaty rights cannot apply in
Alaska.11
Native American tribes have received TAS authority from the
federal government under the auspices of other statutes. “Alaska
native villages are tribes in the political sense of that term and are
similar in all significant respects to the tribes of the contiguous
forty-eight states.”12 Since the State of Alaska cannot be given
management authority, and therefore protect the interests of its
citizens, could Alaska Native Tribes be given TAS authority instead
and take over MMPA management directly? Alternatively, in the
absence of the congressional action needed to achieve TAS, could
the existing principles of the TSGA provide expanded MMPA
management opportunities for tribes, at least with respect to species
managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)? This Article
attempts to answer these questions.
Part I of this Article explains why the State of Alaska cannot
currently assume management over the MMPA. This Part also lays
out the differences between co-management authority, which the
MMPA already grants to Native groups, and transfer authority,
which the statute currently only makes available to state
governments. Part II describes the “Treatment as State” approach
that has been applied to other statutory schemes in order to allow
8

See, e.g., Mary Ann King, Co-Management or Contracting? Agreements
Between Native American Tribes and the U.S. National Park Service Pursuant
to the 1994 Tribal Self-Governance Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 475 (2007);
Ed Goodman, Protecting Habitat for Off-Reservation Tribal Hunting and
Fishing Rights: Tribal Co-Management as a Reserved Right, 30 ENVTL. L. 279
(2000); and Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital
(Part I): Applying Principles of Sovereignty to Protect Imperiled Wildlife
Populations, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2000).
9
Two exceptions are Venetie, whose original treaty and reservation were
revoked by the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, and
Metlakatla, which is the only remaining reservation in Alaska. See DAVID CASE
& DAVID VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 96 (2d ed. 2002).
10
43 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2006).
11
Elizabeth Barret Ristroph, Alaska Tribe’s Melting Subsistence Rights, 1 ARIZ.
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 47, 67 (2010).
12
CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 384.
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tribes to assume the same rights and responsibilities already
accorded to states under those laws. This part explains how TAS
could be applied under the MMPA and what the drawbacks of this
approach are. Part III describes the TSGA approach to transferring
authority over federal programs to tribes. This Part also describes
how such an approach might work under the MMPA, and what the
drawbacks of this approach are likely to be. Part IV provides an
integrated solution to tribal assumption of power under the MMPA
by drawing on the most useful pieces of the TAS provisions and the
TSGA to create a new approach to this type of federal-tribal power
sharing arrangement. This Part also presents how the Nez Perce
Tribe was successfully given off-reservation authority to manage
wildlife. Finally, Part IV concludes that the integrated approach
solves the present deadlock in the most complete manner, without
creating additional difficulties as the other approaches singly may
do.
I. UNDERLYING ISSUES
A. Why Can’t Alaska Assume Management Authority under
the MMPA?
The Alaska State constitution conflicts with certain aspects of
the MMPA; therefore, the state is barred from implementing that
statute. The MMPA permits “any Indian, Aleut or Eskimo who
dwells on the coast of the North Pacific Ocean or the Arctic Ocean”
to take marine mammals for “subsistence purposes.”13 In a 1979
court case, Togiak v. United States,14 the court determined that the
Native exemption to the marine mammal harvest ban in the MMPA,
which allows Alaska Natives to continue to harvest marine
mammals under certain conditions, was an exercise of the United
States’ trust responsibilities to Native Americans, “and an
abandonment of those responsibilities should not be lightly
presumed.”15 This decision forestalled a planned return of
management authority over walrus to the State of Alaska, because

13

16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (2003).
Togiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1979).
15
Id. at 428.
14
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some of the State’s planned regulations would have “had the effect
of prohibiting Native walrus hunting in some areas.”16 In 1981,
amendments to the MMPA would again have allowed the state to
assume jurisdiction over marine mammals as long as the state
protected rural Alaskans’ subsistence rights to harvest marine
mammals.17
Unfortunately, the State is barred by its constitution, which
requires equal access to natural resources and forbids residencybased subsistence preferences, from implementing rural subsistence
hunting programs.18 When the state returned management authority
over walrus back to the federal government in 1979, the State made
it clear that it would not pursue further transfers of authority under
the MMPA.19 Since the State cannot implement the MMPA’s Native
harvest provisions, it cannot retain management authority of marine
mammals under the present statute unless and until the state’s
constitution is amended. There have been at least two major
efforts—in 1990 and 199220—to amend Alaska’s constitution to
correct this conflict with federal law,21 but all efforts have failed.22
To date, no state has been given MMPA authority over any marine
mammal species.23

16

CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 279.
16 U.S.C.A. § 1379(f) (West 2016).
18
McDowell v. Alaska, 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989).
19
MICHAEL BEAN & MELANIE ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
WILDLIFE LAW 145 (3d. ed. 1997); Marine Mammals; Suspension of Hunting
and Killing of Walrus under the 1976 Waiver of the Moratorium, 44 Fed. Reg.
45,565 (Aug. 2, 1979).
20
Alaska Humanities Forum, Modern Alaska–Subsistence, AK HISTORY
COURSE, www.akhistorycourse.org/articles/article.php?artID=259 (last visited
May 12, 2016). See also CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 273 n.102.
21
The state finds itself out of compliance not only with the dictates of the
MMPA, but with the Alaska National Interests Lands Conservation Act as well,
which also mandates a rural subsistence preference. 16 U.S.C. § 3114 (1998).
See also CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 294–302.
22
CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 9, at 273 n.102 (stating that “it has proven
politically impossible to amend the Alaska Constitution to permit residencybased subsistence preferences required under federal law”).
23
Donald C. Baur, Michael L. Gosliner & Nina M. Young, The Law of Marine
Mammal Conservation, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 484 (Donald
C. Baur et al. eds., 2008).
17
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B. Native Co-Management v. Transfer Authority under the MMPA
In order to determine what changes are needed in the current
approach to MMPA implementation, it must first be understood
what management authority the MMPA already grants to Alaska
Natives. Section 119 of the MMPA authorizes the federal
government to enter into cooperative or co-management
arrangements with Alaska Native groups. However, these
agreements are statutorily limited to areas of conservation and
subsistence use and contemplate no other area of marine mammal
management.24 Furthermore, funding for these arrangements is
limited to collecting and analyzing population data, monitoring
harvests, participating in research, and developing co-management
structures.25 Therefore, these agreements are largely limited to
sharing authority over subsistence use and data collection. For
example, the FWS has entered into co-management agreements with
Native entities, including the Eskimo Walrus Commission (EWC).26
“But while FWS has cooperated with EWC in terms of funding,
monitoring, and outreach, there has been no real transfer of authority
to EWC. FWS continues to conduct its own law enforcement, and
the two entities have separate goals regarding walrus
conservation.”27
Federal agencies are naturally reluctant to voluntarily share or
delegate their regulatory authority. As a result, there is an
assumption that the agencies will manage while the tribes will
cooperate, “with relatively little power granted to Native Tribes or
organizations.”28 On the other hand, Section 109 of the MMPA
24

16 U.S.C. § 1388(a) (2016).
16 U.S.C. § 1388(b) (2016).
26
See Marine Mammal Commission, Co-Management and Alaska Native Tribal
Consultation, MMC, http://www.mmc.gov/priority-topics/arctic/comanagement-and-alaska-native-tribal-consultation/ (last visited May 11, 2016).
27
Ristroph, supra note 11, at 75.
28
Honorable Eric Smith, Some Thoughts on Comanangement, 4 HASTINGS W.N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (Summer 1997). One exception may be the
cooperative agreement between the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission and
NOAA Fisheries. This agreement often held up as a model which gives the
Native organization an unusual amount of authority, however, even though “the
AEWC co-management agreement contains provisions for regulation, research
and enforcement, the AEWC clearly does not have equal management authority
for the bowhead [whale]. The management powers of the AEWC are limited by
the fact that it cannot set the quotas itself, nor is the AEWC a formal participant
25
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authorizes the federal government to transfer management authority,
for the “conservation and management” of marine mammal species,
to the states if certain criteria are met.29 This power-sharing
arrangement is much more demanding of the receiving state, but
also provides a much greater breadth of authority. The statute states
that “[t]he Secretary may delegate to a state the ‘administration and
enforcement’ of the MMPA,”30 but “[t]he MMPA does not define
the term “administration,” which arguably could include any of the
Secretary’s duties.”31 While the native co-management arrangement
provides Alaskan Natives with an important opportunity, it does not
provide an opportunity for management of all the variables affecting
marine mammal populations and the effect of subsistence harvest.
It is also worth noting that Native subsistence harvest activities
are unregulated by the federal government unless the species in

in the process of quota setting by the International Whaling Commission.”
Jennifer L. Schorr, The Integration of Traditional Ecological Knowledge and
Science Under Marine Mammal Protection Act Co-Management Agreements 27
(1998) (unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Washington) (on file with the
University of Washington Library). Furthermore, it is widely recognized that the
AEWC was only able to secure so much authority for itself because it secured
the co-management agreement under § 112 of the MMPA. 16 U.S.C. § 1382(c)
(2016). § 112 provides the opportunity for greater authority than § 119 but
agencies have become very reluctant to employ §112 and generally default to §
119 rather than the more commonly used § 119, and because it is also operating
under the auspices of the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling and Whaling Convention Act. Interview with Jessica Lefevre, counsel
for the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, Lefevre Law (July 30, 2015); see
also Jessica Lefevre, A Pioneering Effort in the Design Process and Law
Supporting Integrated Arctic Ocean Management, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10893,
10894 (Oct. 2013). Finally, the difference can also be attributed to the fact that
the AEWC is unusually well-funded through support from the North Slope
Borough, which is supported by tax revenues from the Prudhoe Bay oil fields, a
revenue source not available to other groups. . Interview with Jessica Lefevre,
counsel for the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, Lefevre Law (July 30,
2015); see also Jessica Lefevre, A Pioneering Effort in the Design Process and
Law Supporting Integrated Arctic Ocean Management, 43 ENVTL. L. REP.
10893, 10895 (Oct. 2013).
29
16 U.S.C. § 1379 (2016). The terms “conservation” and “management” are
not defined by the statute in this context but are also not limited only to the area
of subsistence use as they are in § 119.
30
16 U.S.C. § 1379(k) (2016).
31
BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 19, at 143–44. As the authors state, there are
some express limitations found elsewhere in the statute. Id. at 146; see also 16
U.S.C. §§ 1379(b)(3)(B)(i)–(ii), (d)(1) (2016).
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question is listed as “depleted” under the MMPA,32 or “threatened”
or “endangered” under the Endangered Species Act.33 However,
tribes play a small role in the federal government’s decision making
process regarding whether to limit subsistence if or when marine
mammal populations decline.34 Co-management authority as it
currently exists under the MMPA, while an important and useful
tool, is not comparable to the level of control provided for by the
transfer of authority to state provision of the statute; it could be
significantly expanded.
C. Importance of Subsistence for Alaskan Natives
David Case wrote that the term subsistence stands for the
“traditional Alaska Native way of life” and therefore “the ability of
Alaska Natives to maintain subsistence as a way of life is a measure
of their ability to achieve self-determination.”35 Promoting Indian
self-determination has been a goal of federal Indian policy since the
Nixon administration.36 Alaska Native cultural and nutritional needs
are inextricably linked to subsistence harvest; this is particularly true
for remote Arctic communities dependent on marine mammals.37
“[A]dverse impacts to subsistence resources can affect the social
and nutritional health of thousands of indigenous people residing in
Arctic Alaska.”38 Protecting subsistence and Native control over
subsistence contributes to the achievement of Indian selfdetermination.

32

16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (2003).
16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (2016).
34
Ristroph, supra note 11, at 71.
35
David S. Case, Subsistence and Self-determination: Can Alaska Natives Have
a more “Effective Voice”?, 60 COLO. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (1989).
36
See id. at 1010; see also Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–58 (2016); Tribal Self Governance Act of 1994,
25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa–58hh (2014); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249
(Nov. 9, 2000); Memorandum from President Barack Obama for the Heads of
Executive Dep’ts and Agencies on Tribal Consultation (Nov. 5, 2009). available
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/memorandum-tribalconsultation-signed-president.
37
Jessica Lefevre, A Pioneering Effort in the Design Process and Law
Supporting Integrated Arctic Ocean Management, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10893,
10894 (Oct. 2013).
38
Id.
33
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Marine mammal populations are threatened by climate change,
off-shore oil and gas exploration and development, shipping
activity, naval exercises, the cruise ship industry, and incidental take
by commercial fishing operations. Congress has expressly
recognized the importance of marine mammals to Alaskan Native
communities several times.39 Yet, Alaska Natives who depend upon
marine mammals for sustenance and cultural identity have little
significant control over their management. Giving primary
management and enforcement authority to the local community is
often beneficial since community pressure can be more effective in
achieving compliance than government enforcement.40 As
sovereign entities, and ones with unique cultural and essential
subsistence connections to the resource, Alaska Native Tribes
should be given a similar opportunity as the states to accept
responsibility to manage these resources, particularly in Alaska
where there would be no possibility of conflict with state
management.
II. LEGAL APPROACH #1: TAS AUTHORITY
“Treatment as State,” whereby Congress decides to treat tribal
entities as equivalent to states for the purposes of implementing and
managing certain federal programs, is not a new concept. Congress
has amended several statutes to include TAS authority, so that tribes
can attain regulatory primacy, receive federal grant funding, and be
consulted and informed as appropriate.41 The Indian SelfDetermination Act defines “Indian tribe” in part to include “any
Alaska Native village or regional or village corporations as defined
in or established” under Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.42
“Most major federal environmental laws operate on a principle of
39

ANILCA states that “the opportunity for subsistence uses by rural residents of
Alaska . . . is essential to Native physical, economic, traditional, and cultural
existence.” 16 U.S.C. § 3111(1) (2014). Similarly, the MMPA states that one
duty of the Marine Mammal Commission is to make recommendations “for the
protection of the Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts whose livelihoods may be
adversely affected by actions taken pursuant to this Act.” 16 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(7)
(2016).
40
Schorr, supra note 28, at 32.
41
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1)(A) (2016); 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2014); 24
U.S.C. § 300j–11 (2014); 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (2016).
42
25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) (2016).
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cooperative federalism.”43 Federal statutes establish minimum
national standards and encourage states to apply for “primacy”—
that is primary regulatory authority—to implement those standards
within state borders.44 Many environmental laws have been adapted
to allow tribes a similar authority. “Tribal self-determination
persists as the official federal policy and is a central underpinning
for Congress’ recent amendment to the federal environmental
regulatory programs on a similar basis to states.”45 Amending the
statute to include a TAS provision would be the most direct way to
grant Alaska Natives management authority over marine mammals,
comparable to what a state is entitled to under existing MMPA
provisions.
A. A Brief History of TAS Authority
Most federal environmental laws contain mechanisms through
which authority under the statute can devolve from the federal
government (usually the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA))
to the state. This cooperative federalism arrangement allows
environmental laws to be tailored to local environmental, political,
and/or economic conditions; gives local levels of government more
control over local risks and benefits; and increases the opportunity
of input by local citizens. States have been taking advantage of these
opportunities since the 1960s.
In 1984, the EPA adopted regulations recognizing tribes as
“sovereign entities with primary authority and responsibility for the
reservation populace.”46 EPA policy at that time was to assume that
tribal governments had the authority to set standards and manage
environmental programs on reservations.47 This approach was
challenged in Backcountry Against Dumps v. EPA.48 That case held
that where a statute clearly establishes a role for tribes, agencies
43

FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §10.02[1] (2012 ed.).
Id.
45
Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of SelfDetermination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological
Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 230 (1996).
46
Jana Milford, Tribal Authority under the Clean Air Act: How is it Working?,
44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 213, 219 n.35 (2004).
47
Id. at 219.
48
Backcountry against Dumps v. EPA, 100 F.3d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
44
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cannot allow tribes to assume any other role.49 The result was that
since the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, which was at
issue in that case, clearly provided a role for tribes, the EPA could
not on its own authority prescribe any other roles to tribes.50 This is
in contrast to statutes like the Toxic Substances Control Act51 and
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act,52
which do not explicitly assign roles to tribes. For these latter
statutes, the legislative gap left the way open for the EPA to interpret
the statutes in ways that allow tribes to be treated as states for the
implementation of certain programs.53 Therefore, because the
MMPA explicitly provides a role for tribes through co-management,
congressional action is needed before agencies can treat tribes as
states.
Beginning in the 1980s, Congress enshrined the EPA’s
regulatory maneuver into law by passing a series of statutory
amendments to the Clean Air Act (1990),54 Clean Water Act
(1994),55 Safe Drinking Water Act (1986),56 and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (1986).57
These amendments, all similar in language and structure, create a
statutory opportunity for recognized Indian tribes to apply to the
EPA for TAS authority under the various laws.
B. How TAS Works
TAS provisions typically allow Tribes to qualify for TAS if they
have a governing body capable of carrying out substantial
government functions and meeting the specific statutory

49

Id. at 149–51; see also COHEN, supra note 43, §10.02[2].
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act defined tribes as municipalities
and did not provide an opportunity for municipalities to take on the authority
sought by the tribe. Backcountry, 100 F.3d at 149–50.
51
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–29 (1976).
52
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–05 (1986).
53
Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981); see COHEN, supra note 43, §
10.02[2].
54
42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1)(A) (2016).
55
33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2014).
56
24 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (2014).
57
42 U.S.C. § 9626 (2016); In addition, the Federal Insecticide Rodenticide and
Fungicide Act has contained such a provision since 1978. 7 U.S.C. § 136u
(2016).
50
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requirements.58 Once a tribe has TAS authority it must seek
primacy, like states do, from the EPA. If a tribe does not seek
primacy or if a tribe’s program, in the opinion of the federal agency,
does not meet federal criteria. then the EPA retains primacy—just
as it would with state applicants.59 Tribes with TAS authority may
choose to assume primacy over only a subset of regulatory functions
if they prefer.60 The governmental roles offered to Tribes by the
TAS provisions mirror the full spectrum of regulatory roles
available to states: “from basic monitoring to standard setting and
from permit issuing to enforcement.”61
To date, all of the existing TAS provisions effect tribes’ abilities
to perform certain on-reservation regulatory functions. TAS
typically applies to lands “within the boundaries of the reservation
or other areas within the tribe’s jurisdiction.”62 The EPA has also
determined that TAS applies to other off-reservation lands as long
as they qualify as Indian Country, meaning for as long as Indian
groups can assert legal jurisdiction over it. This typically covers
private lands within the exterior boundaries of the reservation but
includes lands exterior of the reservation boundaries as well.63 For
instance, the D.C. Circuit in Arizona Public Service Co. v. EPA
found that § 7601(d) of the Clean Air Act, which is the TAS
provision, applies to the management of air resources “within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation or other areas within the
[tribe’s] jurisdiction,” even if the land is owned in fee simple by
non-Indians.64 Similarly, in Oklahoma Tax Commission, the
Supreme Court defined the term “reservation” to include “trust lands
that have been validly set apart for the use of a tribe even though the
58
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See, e.g., Purpose and Scope, 40 C.F.R. § 123.1(h) (2015), Purpose and
Scope, 40 C.F.R. § 271.1 (2015).
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See, e.g., Partial Delegation of Administrative Authority to a Tribe. 40 C.F.R.
§ 49.122 (2016); see Milford, supra note 46, at 221.
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James Grijalva, EPA’s Indian Policy at Twenty-Five, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVTL., Summer 2010, at 13.
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See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(B) (2016).
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See William C. Scott, The Clean Air Act: “Treatment as States” Rule, March
26, 2008, available at http://corporate.findlaw.com/law-library/the-clean-airact-treatment-as-states-rule.html.
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land has not been formally designated as a reservation,” in addition
to the common understanding of the term “reservation.”65 In Village
of Venetie, the Supreme Court determined that corporate owned
native land, which makes up the bulk of Native lands in Alaska, did
not qualify as Indian Country.66 Most Native lands in Alaska are
owned in fee simple by Native corporations. Therefore, in Alaska,
tribes do not currently have reservation lands67 and marine mammal
management would necessarily be an off-reservation, off-shore
activity anyway.
The fact that Alaska Natives do not have the territorial
sovereignty associated with tribes in the continental U.S. is
irrelevant because the jurisdiction being sought necessarily extends
beyond the boundaries of tribal lands anyway. Therefore, a TAS
provision under the MMPA would have to be somewhat different
from existing TAS provisions and explicitly provide for
management authority outside of Indian Country. The moral/legal
authority for TAS lies in the sovereignty of tribes and the fact that
Indian Country is a trust resource protected by the federal
government on behalf of tribes. Alaskan tribes also retain their
inherent sovereignty and marine mammals have likewise been
recognized as a trust resource protected by the federal government
on their behalf.68
Existing TAS provisions come with the possibility of financial
support to assist tribes in developing capacity and/or carrying out

65

63 Fed. Reg. 7,254, 7,258 (Feb. 12, 1998) (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 511 (1991)).
66
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520 (1998)
(holding that lands owned by Alaska Native corporations are not Indian Country
because they are not permanently set aside for the exclusive use of tribes).
Similarly, the Clean Water Act defines “Federal Indian Reservation” as all land
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
State Government.” 33 U.S.C. § 1377(h)(1) (2014).
67
With the single exception of Annette Island Reserve at Metlakatla, which is
the only reservation in Alaska,
68
See Togiak v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 423, 428 (D.D.C. 1979) (construing
the exemptions for Native Alaskan hunting found in statutes, such as the Marine
Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act, as imposing a trust
responsibility on the federal government to protect Alaskan Natives’ rights to
subsistence hunting).
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the functions of the relevant statute.69 As with other TAS provisions,
financial support would be essential under the MMPA, both to help
tribes build capacity in order to meet the criteria necessary to be
treated as a state, and to earn transfer authority for specific
programs. This type of financial support is not unique to TAS
agreements; states have also always been eligible to receive
financial support under the environmental statutes70 and under the
MMPA.71
Another challenge is that “tribes do not have criminal authority
to punish non-Indians who violate tribal, state, or federal laws.”72
Under Montana v. United States,73 the Supreme Court held that
tribes cannot enforce tribal rules against non-Indians unless the nonIndians have entered into consensual agreements with the tribe or
tribal members, or the conduct in question threatens the tribe’s
political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare.74 In
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co.,75 the
Supreme Court held that the Montana test was applicable only to
non-Indian conduct that “imperils the subsistence or welfare of the
tribe” such that tribal regulation is “necessary to avert catastrophic
consequences” for tribal self-government. Therefore, the issue of
enforcement may be a stumbling block to Native management, but
the problem can be circumvented.
Under existing TAS provisions, tribes overcome this problem by
passing on enforcement requests to the EPA, which does the
69

See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(B) (2016) and 33 U.S.C. § 1377(c), (e), (f)
(2014); see Actions under Section 301(d)(4) Authority, 40 C.F.R. § 49.11(b)
(2015).
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See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7405, 7406 (2014).
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ANIMAL L. 109, 112–13 (2007).
73
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). In this case the Crow tribe of
Montana attempted to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on land
owned by non-Indians within the boundaries of the reservation.
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Id. at 565–66. See also United States v. Mazuvie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975)
(finding that tribes have regulatory authority over non-Indians if Congress
delegates that power to them).
75
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341
(2008). In this case the tribe attempted to regulate the sale of non-Indian lands
within the external boundaries of the reservation, but the court found that the
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enforcement on behalf of tribes. Congress and the EPA developed
clear lines of authority in the area of off-reservation enforcement
over non-Indians in order to circumvent such enforcement
problems. The statutory and regulatory provisions recognize tribes’
inherent sovereignty to develop air and water quality standards;
however, it is the EPA that is “the entity that ultimately adopts and
enforces the standards that apply to non-Indians, and the process
involves opportunity for public comment and challenge of the tribal
proposals.”76
III. LEGAL APPROACH #2: TSGA AND TRANSFER OF DOI OFFRESERVATION PROGRAMS TO TRIBES
Tribal self-determination is “the recognition that Tribal
governments are the fundamental governmental units to implement
Indian policy.”77 As the Congressional Statement of Findings in the
TSGA states:
transferring control to tribal governments . . . over
funding and for Federal programs, services,
functions, and activities . . . is an effective way to
implement the Federal policy of government-togovernment relations with Indian Tribes; and
transferring control to tribal governments . . .
strengthens the Federal policy of Indian selfdetermination.78
A. Brief History of TSGA
In 1975 Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA).79 This statute attempts to
stimulate Native American self-governance by encouraging tribes to
undertake management and implementation of federal Indian
76

Goodman, supra note 8; see also Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280,
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RESOURCES & ENVTL., Summer 2012, at 1.
78
Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–413,108 Stat. 4250
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programs.80 Federal bureaucracy and paternalism were recognized
as having eroded tribal self-governance, and the new statute created
a process through which Indian programs were removed from
Bureau of Indian Affairs administration and placed in the hands of
tribal governments.81 This approach explicitly includes federal
funding to assist tribes in carrying out these functions.82 In 1994,
ISDEAA was amended by the Tribal Self Governance Act,83 which
expands the scope of programs which can be transferred to tribal
governments beyond simply those programs initially administered
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to programs administered by other
Department of the Interior (DOI) agencies.84
The MMPA divides management over marine mammal species
between the Department of Commerce and the Department of the
Interior, such that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) Fisheries manages cetaceans and
pinnipeds other than walrus, and the FWS manages all other marine
mammals, including: sea otter, walrus, polar bear, dugong, and
manatee.85 Because of the limitation of TSGA’s application to DOI
agencies,86 using TSGA to gain greater tribal authority over marine
mammals will only be relevant to expanded tribal management of
species currently managed by the FWS.
B. How TSGA Works
The TSGA creates a process through which management
authority over DOI off-reservation programs that have “special
geographic, historical, or cultural significance” to a tribe may be
transferred to a tribal government.87 This potentially authorizes the
transfer to tribal management of a wide variety of off-reservation
programs, and once a program is transferred then funding becomes
available as well.88 The transfer of federal programs is accomplished
80
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through negotiated Annual Funding Agreements which transfer both
authority over a program and the funding necessary to administer
the program to the tribal government.89 Because this tool applies to
off-reservation programs, the existence of “Indian Country” is
unnecessary and Alaska Native Tribes may participate.
To be eligible for program management under the TSGA, tribes
must complete a planning phase, request participation by official
resolution or action by a tribal governing body, and demonstrate at
least three years of fiscal stability.90 Tribes can then petition for
management of entire programs or only portions of programs.91 This
flexibility may suit Alaskan Tribes that do not wish to assume
authority over the entire MMPA program, or even all management
functions for a single species, but do want greater authority over
programs like harvest administration or habitat management. Under
the TSGA, tribes are allowed to come together as consortia to take
over a DOI program.92 Existing tribal consortia like IPCoMM, the
Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission, and others may already be
well positioned to take advantage of this opportunity.93
Each DOI agency retains discretion over whether to transfer the
requested program to the relevant tribe.94 The TSGA prohibits the
transfer to tribes of “inherently federal functions,”95 and the question
of which functions are “inherently federal” is left open for the DOI
to answer.96 In 2010, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
published a policy letter defining “inherently governmental
function” and the definition’s application to all federal agencies.97
The definition adopted by OMB states that the term “means a
function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to
require performance by Federal [g]overnment employees.”98
89
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Ultimately, a great deal of discretion is left in the hands of the
agencies to determine whether a program is inherently a federal
function or not, and it is not clear how the FWS might interpret a
petition to manage all or some programs under the MMPA. As King
writes, the agencies “are obligated to negotiate, but not to come to
an agreement.”99 However, since the MMPA itself contemplates
delegating this very same authority to states, it seems unlikely that
these functions could be described as “inherently federal” so as to
exclude the possibility of tribal control.
Like the TAS arrangement, enforcement of tribal rules over nontribal members, especially off-reservation, could be a problem for
TSGA implementation. However, enforcement over non-Indians
could simply be left to the federal agency since tribes may request
authority over only certain aspects of programs if they choose.
Finally, the TSGA allows the Secretary to retract programs that have
been delegated to tribes where there is “imminent jeopardy to a
physical trust asset, natural resources, or public health and
safety.”100
The federal government’s policy has been to encourage tribal
self-governance in areas pertaining to tribal members’ health and
welfare.101 However, tribes are not given the opportunity for equal
status to that of states under the MMPA; they are essentially being
treated as though they are not the separate sovereign entities they are
known to be.102 For many tribes in Alaska, the fluctuation of marine
mammal populations impacts the economic security, health, and
welfare of the tribe, and tribal governments may be the best able to
anticipate and mitigate those impacts.

75 Fed. Reg. at 16,193 (the definition also providing a non-exclusive list of
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IV. COMBINING FRAMEWORK OF TSGA WITH THE TRIBAL SELFGOVERNANCE INTENTIONS OF TAS COULD LEAD TO A BETTER
OVERALL SOLUTION
Congressional action combining the underlying principles of the
TSGA with the more practical framework of the TAS provisions
could provide a good model for the MMPA. Congressional action is
preferable because it provides needed legitimation, moral
leadership, and specific statutory authority.103
There are several obstacles in the way of applying either the TAS
or TSGA approaches individually, as they currently exist, to the
MMPA. First, the TAS provisions have so far only been applicable
to on-reservation functions. On the other hand, the TSGA has
already been expressly applied to tribal management offreservation, which seems to be more applicable to the MMPA
context. The downside of the TSGA approach is that it only creates
the opportunity for management authority over programs designated
as eligible (not inherently federal) by the agency in charge;
therefore, certain programs or functions can be excluded from tribal
management at the agency’s discretion. TAS provides unequivocal
authority for tribes to assume authority over certain federal
programs if the tribes meet basic federal requirements. This provides
a certainty that is not available under the TSGA. Additionally, the
TSGA provisions only apply to DOI agencies. MMPA management
is divided between the FWS (DOI) and NOAA (Department of
Commerce), with certain marine mammal species being assigned to
each agency. Therefore, only a few species would even be eligible
for tribal management under the TSGA.
On the other hand, it should be relatively easy to integrate the
two approaches. Both the TSGA and TAS104 provisions can be
applied to tribal consortiums, and both TAS and TSGA resolve
many difficulties in similar ways. For instance, under both scenarios
enforcement over non-Indians can be left to the federal agency.
Additionally, both approaches retain strict federal oversight so that
programs can be withdrawn from tribal management if statutory
requirements are not being met. Therefore, the two programs,
103
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though they contain several significant differences, are very
compatible.
For various reasons, tribes have been slower than anticipated in
taking up the opportunity presented by the TAS amendments. To
counter that slow response, the EPA has now established an
additional program that allows tribes to use EPA’s own federal
implementation of pollution laws. This does not require TAS status
or tribal program development. Instead, tribes may take over the
EPA’s own implementation including “setting standards, issuing
permits, and regulating underground injections” under the Clean
Water Act and hazardous waste management under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act.105 This is a non-DOI agency taking
an approach through regulation that is remarkably similar to the one
found in the TSGA. Co-management, as it currently exists, has so
far proved insufficient to meet the tribes’ purposes. If Congress
combines the most applicable aspects of both the TSGA and the
TAS approaches, an MMPA amendment could be fashioned that
creates meaningful opportunity for management transfer to Tribes
under the MMPA, one that mimics what states have already been
offered.
It is not unprecedented for the federal government to delegate
off-reservation wildlife management authority to tribes. One
prominent example is that of the Nez Perce taking over state-wide
management authority of the gray wolf beginning in 1996.106 This
was possible because the federal government’s more obvious
partner, the State of Idaho, passed a series of laws and approved
several wolf management plans that explicitly conflicted with
federal objectives. These actions made it impossible for the State to
cooperate with the federal government on the matter.107 This
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certainly echoes the current marine mammal management situation
in Alaska.

CONCLUSION
Alaskan tribes may not currently have the capacity to meet the
management requirements necessary for transfer of authority under
the MMPA, regardless of the legal mechanism employed. However,
there is nothing to preclude them from developing and ultimately
exercising such capacity. The EPA and Congress have built funding
for capacity building into the TAS program, and funding has also
long been contemplated in the TSGA program as well. The MMPA
itself contemplates providing funding to states to assist them in
developing and administering marine mammal management
programs.108 Any approach attempted on behalf of tribes under the
MMPA should do likewise.
Alaska Native tribes, like states, are sovereign entities.
Furthermore, tribes have important historic, cultural, economic, and
sustenance ties to marine mammals and marine resources. The
federal government has many times reiterated its position that
Native sovereignty must be respected and Native self-governance
encouraged. Additionally, Congress explicitly intended MMPA
management authority to devolve to a more local level of
government. Expanding the scope of Native authority under the
MMPA is the next logical step in reaching these federal objectives.
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